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One should never apologize before giving a conference paper, so let me merely preface what
I'm going to say today with some warnings, for which I am not apologizing. Firstly, some of you
may have heard some of the material in this piece at other events; it's a thought-in-process work that
has seen previous incarnations. Secondly, because of the breadth of literary material that I intend to
cover here, I will sometimes have to deal with this in less detail than is ideal, which seems to be a
necessary trade-off. Finally, I'd like to issue a trigger warning: I will be talking about depictions of
sexual violence today and I need to ensure that everybody present, and particularly anybody for
whom that might induce trauma, is aware of that. Let me begin. [SLIDE]
There seems a duty incumbent upon those studying the field of contemporary fiction to
acknowledge the problematic nature of national boundaries. In an era of continued globalization and
apparently unstoppable neoliberal models, self-determination seems to be locked in its paradoxical
formations more firmly than ever. If we acknowledge the validity and necessity of a transnational
formation,  however,  language still  remains  an  issue that  firmly  divides,  even on the  American
continent.  The  occidental  academy  remains  focused  upon  English-language  works  and  the
translation is left in a problematic space that seems still to grapple with the dilemmas posed by
Walter Benjamin in his 1923 “The Translator's Task”. It may be that these dilemmas are intractable,
but  for  meditations  upon  the  academy,  its  interrelation  with  neoliberalism and  the  dangers  of
national literatures, alongside the problems of didacticism and the “bad translation” of a “message”
(Benjamin 2012, 75) one could do worse than to look, as this paper will, at Roberto Bolaño's 2666,
even if it is in translation. Before I move to Bolaño, though, I want to think about the traditions in
which his fiction sits and the ways in which this literary mapping might re-enable us to think of
“American Literature” as “American Continent Literature”. The primary tradition against which I
want to juxtapose Bolaño is the North American postmodern encyclopaedic tradition as represented
by Thomas Pynchon. [SLIDE]
Since the publication of Thomas Pynchon's third novel,  Gravity's Rainbow, in 1973, it has
been  clear  to  most  that  his  works  have  engaged with  specific  ethico-political  ideologies.  That
Pynchon is  “a  step leftward  of  registering to  vote  as  a  Democrat,”  as  one  character  puts  it  in
Vineland, seems clear. Where exactly within his texts, especially the earlier works, this sentiment
comes from is, however, a very different matter. Furthermore, if we're not willing to drill down and
find these moments, we need to be careful for, as Adorno has cautioned us, in his Hegelian riff: the
Whole is merely the false. To kick off this authorial juxtaposition, I want to take a touring career-
wide sweep of Pynchon's ethics and politics, but I also want to begin to ask questions about a
practice  that  I  see  in  his  work,  that  carries  over  into  Bolaño's  2666,  that  I've  called  “crypto-
didacticism”.  How do Pynchon's  novels  get  us  onside  for  their  ethics;  what  are  their  didactic,
moralising techniques and practices (for surely, when we say ethics, what we usually mean are the
morals we like, as opposed to a discourse on the nature of moral thinking); and how might this
relate to Pynchon's aesthetics? [SLIDE]
To begin with some taxonomical observations, Pynchon's works fall, broadly speaking, into
two distinct categories: the California cycle of The Crying of Lot 49, Vineland and Inherent Vice can
be contrasted with the epic historical or historiographic works,  V.,  Gravity’s Rainbow,  Mason &
Dixon  and  Against  the  Day.  Pynchon  has  also  written  three  essay  pieces:  “Is  it  OK  to  be  a
Luddite?”, “Nearer my Couch to Thee” and “Into the Mind of Watts” (there are further paratexts of
note to the field, which consist mostly of introductions to works such as 1984, CD liner notes and
Pynchon's personal editorial correspondence). This primary taxonomy of Californian vs. epic novels
is important for thinking about Pynchon's ethics because it puts two specific historical moments
under  the  spotlight:  1.)  the  failure  of  the  Leftist  project  in  the  1960s  and  2.)  the  enduring
repercussions  felt  under  the  Reagan  administration  and  aggressive  neoliberal  modes  since  the
1980s. The California cycle novels are set distinctly in these frames, while the epics bring us a
history  of  the  present  which,  to  my  eyes,  and  also  to  David  Cowart's,  look  distinctly  like
Foucauldian  genealogies:  critical  histories  of  the  Rocket  and NASA in  Gravity's  Rainbow,  the
Enlightenment in Mason & Dixon and twenty-first-century capitalism in Against the Day (OK, you
might  dispute  that  Against  the  Day  is  focused  on  this  aspect,  but  then  a  text  with  over  700
characters is bound to bring some level of diversity).
The primary point of my focus on Pynchon's works today will be the epic historical cycle as
these are his lengthy, encyclopaedic novels that mirror the function of 2666.
Ethical approaches to Pynchon's earliest novel, V., [SLIDE] have been twofold in form, that
I believe can be said to contribute to a normative ethics and a meta-ethics. The normative ethical
proclamations in V. seem to be concerned with Nazism and are most prominently brought to the fore
through the novel's focus upon the Herero genocide,  an otherwise broadly neglected episode in
early twentieth-century history, when history is given a capital “H”. During Foppl's siege party, a
crucial episode in that first text, Pynchon writes of an association with Nazism that is hard to shake.
Indeed,  the  sinister  Weissman,  who  will  later  re-appear  in  Gravity's  Rainbow,  manifests  his
tendencies  towards  extreme,  right-wing  politics  through  his  interrogation  of  Mondaugen's
knowledge of “D'Annunzio”, “Mussolini”, “Fascisti” and the “National Socialist German Workers'
Party”.  Finally,  he  is  disappointed:  SLIDE  “'[f]rom  Munich  and  never  heard  of  Hitler,'  said
Weissmann, as if 'Hitler' were the name of an avant-garde play”. Perhaps the most notorious line for
ethical thinking in V., however, is the infamous statement of the narrator on the number of murders
committed in the Herero genocide that  SLIDE  “[t]his is only 1 per cent of six million, but still
pretty  good”,  which  obviously  brings  in  problematic  notions  of  Holocaust  absolutism  against
relativity and a whole series of debates with Eli Wiesel's stance that have yet to be fully played out
in the field. This relativising strain spills over into the meta-ethical stance in V., which can now be
properly historicized as a product of its time: there is a clear focus on narratives of alterity. From
our perspective, as Shawn Smith puts it, it is “no longer new or revolutionary” to state that “history
is a field of competing rhetorical or narrative strategies”. Pynchon, in 1963, however, seems to take
exactly that stance.
Gravity's Rainbow, [SLIDE] the next of Pynchon's epics and still his most celebrated work,
takes  a  different  tack.  The  most  prominent  theme  in  this  novel  seems  to  be  the  genesis  of
contemporary America's technological and economic supremacy in the slave labour camps that built
the  V2.  Although  Gravity's  Rainbow forks  and  branches  and  scorns  the  heresy  of  reductive
interpretation  as  privileging  some  nebulous  platonic  “Real  Text”  (with  capitalised  casing),  the
primacy placed on the epigraph attributed to Wernher von Braun, the head of NASA who also
worked on the V2 programme in World War II, seems also to privilege this particular historical
strand. Alongside this, of course, lies an abundance of other areas to explore, but the strand that
takes the silver medal in Gravity's Rainbow, for me, is the surfacing of Pynchon's enduring interest
in ecology, particularly in the scene where Slothrop receives Luddite suggestions from a pine tree,
suggesting he sabotage the local farm equipment. Pynchon's techniques for staging the genealogy of
the Rocket, as we might call it,  though, are interesting. Less blunt than  V.,  Pynchon moves the
Holocaust to the periphery of his novel. We never receive the metonymic “Auschwitz”, but instead
are  given  “camp Dora”.  Approach  and  avoid  is  the  highlighting  technique.  It  seems  also  that
Pynchon has, by this stage, begun to consider the advice of Corlies Smith, his friend and editor.
Smith  told  Pynchon,  in  their  editorial  correspondence  for  V.,  SLIDE  that  he  thought  Pynchon
should avoid trying to write a protest novel. It seems to me that, in  Gravity's Rainbow, Pynchon
attempts to write a cloaked protest novel that buries its target amid its overloaded, encyclopaedic
form.
After a long break of 20 years, Pynchon's readers were confronted with Vineland, Pynchon's
most disparaged novel.  SLIDE  What they were expecting, however, was Mason & Dixon which
was instead released in 1997. Another of Pynchon's epics, this novel charts the surveying escapades
of the eponymous protagonists, with great potential for the ironic historiographic metafiction for
which Pynchon is famed, in relation to the American Civil War. Full of metafictive play, including a
narrative that metaleptically folds across its enclosed diegetic layers, the normative ethics in this
novel seem, straightforwardly, to centre on slavery, its link to Enlightenment and capitalism. Dixon,
in Pynchon's version, snatches a whip from a slave driver in a central episode. The future-orientated
twist that Pynchon introduces is to tie this to a critique of instrumental rationality and twentieth-
century contexts,  tying in precarity and indentured wage labour:  “slavery leading the charge to
Enlightenment” as Brian Thill puts it – while Pynchon puts it another: “Commerce without Slavery
is unthinkable”, a slavery which depends upon the “gallows”.  Mason & Dixon is also a highly
interesting text on the aesthetic level, not only for its playful narrative interweaving, but also for its
use of 18th-century grammatical and typographical conventions, adding an extra layer of reader
involvement in the process.
The final of Pynchon's epics, so far, is  SLIDE Against the Day, his 2006 genre-bending
behemoth that charts the period between the 1893 Chicago World's Fair to just before World War II
with a cast comprised of airships, anarchists and shamans. Although this work is extreme, even by
standards of the encyclopaedic novel, there seems to be a particular focus given, as is the case
across many of Pynchon's works, to anarchism. At a basic level,  Against the Day makes direct
reference  to  a  large  number  of  prominent  historical  anarchists,  not  all  of  whose  names  I  can
pronounce;  Benjamin Tucker,  Leon Czolgosz,  Mikhail  Bakunin,  Peter  Kropotkin,  Jean-Baptiste
Sipido, Gaetano Bresci and Luigi Lucheni among others. Anarchism, in Pynchon's text, is presented
as a dualism; on the positive side, the product of a liberating socialism, but also, in its terroristic
capacity, an affirmation of Reaganomics, the outcome of devolved autonomy – the well-known
libertarian problem of freedom to, vs. freedom from. Of course, it's Pynchon, so we get a double-
edged presentation. On the one hand, there seems to be a critique of anarchism via the idea of a
narrowed temporal bandwidth that Pynchon had earlier used in Gravity's Rainbow when he writes:
“[t]hese  people  […] they're  all  so  unanchored,  no  history,  no  responsibility,  one  day they  just
appear,  don't  they,  each with his  own secret  designs”.  Conversely,  though,  Lew Basnight  finds
himself unable to reconcile the “bearded, wild-eyed, bomb-Rolling” description furnished by his
agency with the people he meets in the company of Moss Gatlin, the travelling anarchist preacher.
The injustice of the social stereotype is finally driven home when Pynchon writes of the betrayal
felt on account of the mainstream representation: “[t]he Anarchists and Socialists on the shift had
their own mixed feelings about history”.
From this brief overview, which is complemented by an iceberg-like reading in which the
California cycle must remain submerged, a crude but useful, ethical schema can be drawn from
Pynchon's novels:
[SLIDE]
1.) The genesis of instrumental rationality in the Enlightenment
2.)  The  interlinking  of  slavery  with  a  rational  capitalism,  in  which  Pynchon  retains  a  Puritan
inflection, and which leads to ecological destruction
3.) The Frankfurt-School-esque terminus of this mode of rationality in the death and labor camps
4.) the interlinking of such genocide with specifically right-wing politics and economic practices
5.)  the  predication  of  contemporary  America's  technological  and  economic  supremacy  upon
histories of such politics and practices
SLIDE  In addition to these precepts, which could have been deduced by just sitting down and
reading a lot of Marcuse and Adorno, it also seems fairly clear that agency in Pynchon's texts is
constrained by a  form of social  subjectification.  Although others  have contested a  Foucauldian
parallel on the grounds of differing power models, I think there's a good case to be made to see
alignment  between  Pynchon  and  late-Foucault  (say,  in  the  College  de  France  lecture  series
published under the title  The Hermeneutics of the Self) here because it marks a continual tension
between a self that can act upon others and itself (consider GR's “we do know what's going on and
we let it go on”) and a self that is wholly constructed by forces beyond the power and knowledge of
the actor (“the cosmic fascist  in our DNA” of Frenesi in  Vineland).  As Judith Butler puts it in
Giving an Account of Oneself: “[t]his ethical agency is neither fully determined nor radically free”.
This brings me, after this survey, back to thinking about Pynchon's didacticism and morality,
as opposed to that we call ethics in literature. Derek Attridge proposes that the study of literary
ethics must remain sensitive to “to the work's distinct utterance”, or to rephrase, that it should avoid
Adorno's criticism of applied philosophy which only reads out of works airs of its own concretion.
It  seems to me,  however,  that  an ethical  consideration of  literature must  consider  not  only the
normative doctrines that are communicated, with all the dangers of literary instrumentalism and
confirmation bias that must carry, but the formal and aesthetic means by which such doctrines are
conveyed and the way in which they are interlinked. What specific didactic techniques inhere within
the  aesthetic  of  an  encyclopaedic  work?  Is  there,  potentially,  a  technique  here  through  which
Pynchon  enlists  our  support  through  our  own,  complicit  investment  of  intellectual  capital  into
decoding  and  understanding  his  works?  Pynchon's  works  are  ideological  worlds,  full  of  false
representation  and it  seems unfair  to  have  spent  such effort  decoding them if  not  to  critically
question the subjects that Pynchon attempts to interpellate through his hailing devices: “ha, reader!
Caught you with your pants down!”
With this mode of didacticism and ethics in mind, let me now turn to Roberto Bolano. [SLIDE]
2666  has been heralded as phenomenal. Impossible to do justice to its size and scope, by
way of  synopsis,  Bolaño's  novel  interweaves  five  narratives  concerning:  a  set  of  self-absorbed
literary critics, Oscar Amalfitano, Oscar Fate, Bolaño's fictional reclusive author Archimbaldi and a
central section on “the crimes” across a 900 page epic. These “crimes” form the dystopian, or form
of utopian, centrepiece with which the novel batters its reader: the sequential, gruelling description
of the bodies of the female sexual homicides around the fictional town of Santa Teresa, a thinly
veiled rendition of the ongoing, horrendous reality in Ciudad Juárez. In literary terms,  2666 is an
explicitly metatextual work that, as I've suggested, situates itself within two traditions: the utopian
work and the encyclopaedic novel, in the latter case particularly of the North American variety. This
can be seen twofold in the text itself. Firstly, in response to its own representations of violence, the
work overtly queries utopian premises when it asks “why Thomas More [...]?” (Bolaño 2009, 193).
Secondly, Bolaño aims for his novel to be the “great, imperfect, torrential [work]” that struggles
“against something, that something that terrifies us all, that something that […] spurs us on, amid
blood and mortal wounds and stench,” thus invoking debates about autonomous and committed art
forms (Bolaño 2009, 227). [SLIDE]
An aspect of this work that is worth considering, however, is the extent to which Bolaño's
novel could fall under the remit of this same category of “crypto-didacticism” and the degree to
which those in the academy given the task of “teaching post-millennial fiction” should be aware
that they might also read such a statement in its adjectival form: post-millennial fiction that teaches.
The university is awarded a central place in 2666, which is certainly a dubious honour, but it is the
contention of the second part of this paper that the novel trains its didactic strains back upon the
academy in a utopian mode that still sees a limited potential for redemption. Furthermore, in the
realm of aesthetics, it is also worth considering 2666 in a tradition of, and alongside, postmodern
American  encyclopaedic  fiction;  after  all,  Archimbaldi,  Bolaño's  secretive,  protagonist,  author
character is a recluse, like Pynchon, famed within the academy for his literary fiction (in fact, Grant
Farred has called this character “Pynchonesque”).
If the crypto-didactic mode is one which cloaks its purpose in a super-dense structure so
that, by the necessary intellectual capital that the reader is forced to expend in comprehension, its
fundamental normative ethical propositions are all the harder for the reader to reject, how do we
enter Bolaño in this way? Well, one way of rethinking Bolaño in the crypto-didactic mode is to
realise that if  we think back to the deliberately reductive ethical propositions that I  drew from
Pynchon's work, it seems that, again reductively, a similar ethical formula can be deduced from
2666: four hundred women have been tortured, raped and murdered, the police do nothing about it
because the victims are working class  women and, to  quote Bolaño directly,  “nobody noticed”
(Bolaño  2009,  372).  In  other  words,  amid  rampant  “gynophobia”  (Bolaño  2009,  382)  and
omnipresent misogyny: “the women here aren't worth shit” (Bolaño 2009, 318).
Although  very  different  from the  reading  advanced  here,  Grant  Farred  has  argued  that
Bolaño's true focus in this ethical setup is upon a critique of postcolonialism's entanglement with
neoliberalism, a critique that, nonetheless, further strengthens the notion of a crypto-didactic text.
To  put  it  concisely:  twenty-first-century  readings  of  complex,  lengthy  fictions  tend,  in  the
academy's model of an ethical turn, towards a specific didactic hermeneutic in which the novel is
seen as a disciplinary text that attempts to interpellate subjects within its own moral framework.
[SLIDE] Indeed it  could be,  for these novels,  as  2666's  Florita  Almada puts  it,  that  “teaching
children might be the best job in the world, gently opening children's eyes, even the tiniest bit”
(Bolaño  2009,  456).  Bolaño  sets  about  opening  our  eyes,  though,  through  the  process  of
interpretation; to leap straightforwardly to the endpoint is to miss the subject-forming aspect of
these texts. Hence, the didacticism is encoded in such a way that the reader must invest intellectual
energy, or capital, in the text in order to purchase the ethical payoff. This, of course, presents a
problem for theoretical literary research upon such work. To jump to the pre-formulated end result
degrades the utopic power of such fiction. This is, though, the same problem that explication creates
in any form, for as Louis Marin writes in his study of Utopics: “[t]he benefits of pleasure the textual
word play triggered were capitalized into analyses and theses. An authoritative power settled at the
very spot of what is not capable of interpretation […] It may simply be impossible to write and
speak about utopia” (Marin 1990, xx).
In  this  problem of  explication  against  utopian  function,  it  is  profitable  to  consider  the
theoretical  paradigms within  which  Bolaño's  work  places  itself.  [SLIDE]  Although  it  is  often
thought within theoretico-literary practice that new fictions require new ways of reading, this may
not  straightforwardly  be  true,  especially  across  such  constructed  bounds  as  “post-millennial
literature”; after all, this is based on a Christian calendar, a particularly problematic construction, as
shall be seen, for 2666. What seems clear is that it is possible to identify certain emergent trends of
practice, some of which seem totally new and could require new modes of reading, while others
have a clear trajectory from well before the century's break. With this in mind, refraining from the
nonetheless  interesting  (and  certainly  more  fashionable)  approaches  through  Hardt,  Negri  or
Agamben, it is worth examining the way that 2666 stages Theodor Adorno's formulation on ideas of
autonomous and committed art while considering Bolaño's last novel within two opposed critical
frameworks: as political and as utopian. These frameworks are opposed because, in the instance of
political success, the critical utopian function of the artwork is destroyed: as Marin puts it, this is
when utopic practice comes “to the awareness of its own process” as “revolutionary praxis” (Marin
1990,  279).  This  consideration should help to  explain the crypto-didactic  movement because it
exposes the way that the novel works through theoretical models of pornography and violence.
[SLIDE]  Adorno's essay “Commitment” presents a specific response to Sartre's notion of
committed literature that  is  relevant  to  the discussion at  hand.  Although Adorno is  also highly
critical of the term “commitment” for its coercive mode of non-freedom in existentialist philosophy
in the essay piece “Commitment” Adorno posits two polarities of literature: committed art that has a
specific political aim, but  [SLIDE] “strips the magic from a work of art that is content to be a
fetish” (Adorno 2007, 175) and autonomous art, or “art for art's sake” that falsely denounces its
own “ineradicable connection with reality” (Adorno 2007, 176). These positions, in which each
dialectically “negates itself with the other” (Adorno 2007, 176), constitute the space in which all art,
Adorno claims, has lived. Interestingly for the discussion at hand, Adorno stresses that Brecht's
original intention, in which Adorno believes he failed, was to practice an art that  [SLIDE] “both
presents itself as didactic, and claims aesthetic dispensation from responsibility for the accuracy of
what it teaches” (Adorno 2007, 183). The first problem for Brecht, as Adorno sees it, is that “the
more preoccupied [he] becomes with information, and the less he looks for images, the more he
misses the essence of capitalism which the parable is supposed to present” (Adorno 2007, 183). The
second is that, in Brecht's downgraded metaphors, in this case the substitution of a “trivial gangster
organization” for “a conspiracy of the wealthy and powerful” in The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui,
“the true horror of fascism is conjured away” (Adorno 2007, 184). As Adorno puts it in this piece:
[SLIDE]  “[f]or the sake of political  commitment,  political  reality is  trivialized” (Adorno 2007,
184–185)  and  in  The  Jargon  of  Authenticity, “'[c]ommitment'  is  the  current  word  for  the
unreasonable demand of discipline” (Adorno 1986, 69).
2666  is,  in many ways, analogous. A work of epic theatre that nonetheless “has no epic
pretensions”, as Farred puts it, the novel seeks to “make men think,” in Adorno's phrase, but it does
not rely upon a Brechtian verfremdungseffekt. Instead, it cloaks any metafictional estrangement in
the mechanism of its action. It is an overloading, not distancing, effect. Furthermore, Bolaño's novel
goes a long way towards a negation of Adorno's warning of committed literature's affiliation to
pornography. [SLIDE] This is not the more recent idea of “empathy fatigue” espoused in the wake
of mass media culture, bur rather that, for Adorno, “[t]he so-called artistic representation of the
sheer  physical  pain  of  people  […] contains,  however  remotely,  the power to  elicit  enjoyment”
(Adorno 2007, 189). While Carolyn J. Dean points out, in her critique of this argument, that this
strain of thought has a heritage as far back as Diderot in the eighteenth century (Dean 2003, 89), but
substantially increased in usage around the 1960s in reference to the Holocaust, Bolaño recognises
this conflation of sexuality and power that can occur in artistic representation and so constantly
reminds the reader that  this  pornographic mode is  also one of sexual violence.  Every time the
potential to forget the affinity between the modes surfaces, the text reminds us that many, if not all,
of the victims piled up in 2666 have been both vaginally and anally raped. Furthermore, in 2666's
discussion of snuff films, Bolaño gives the reader a strong metatextual clue as to where the novel
sits, reminding us of both the mimetic fallacy, but also the pornographic potential that, it seems, the
novel wishes to avoid: “the snuff industry, in this context, was just a symptom” (Bolaño 2009, 536).
To  rephrase  this:  Bolaño  appreciates  the  fine  line  between  empathy  and  pornography  and
metafictionally signposts this so that, each time the trap is open, the reader is pointed around the
pitfall.  Bolaño,  like  Dean,  wants  to  express  “something quite  a  bit  more  complicated  than  the
conventional notion that pornography represents an unspeakable association between sexuality and
murder”  (Dean  2003,  106),  but  is  aware  of  this  link  and  warns  the  reader  of  their  potential
complicity.
As a text that seeks, then, to ethically explore the power of fiction in the wake of mass
murder, it is worth considering how 2666 fits within a utopian tradition. It turns out that this is in
fact linked, in several ways, to the mode of didacticism that the novel employs, in the idea of
“process”. In the study of literary aesthetics, fictions such as 2666 are usually not deemed important
so much for the specific topoi they present, although these are undoubtedly of enormous real-world
significance and there is the ever-present danger of disserving that suffering in critique and analysis,
but  rather  for  their  more  generalizable  qualities  of  dislocation  and  reformulation.  This  idea  of
dislocation and reformulation,  a  subjunctive thinking-otherwise,  is,  of course,  a  key concept  in
utopian fiction. The notion of 2666 as a fiction of process also encroaches on this realm however
and can also, perhaps albeit unintentionally, be seen in other works of twenty-first century fiction.
Consider, as an example,  [SLIDE] Haruki Murakami's  1Q84 with its abandonment of resolution.
This work enacts a very different mode of indeterminate conclusion to Pynchon's novels, which
frequently end in the apocalyptic sublime, or ironic nostalgia, or even to David Foster Wallace's The
Broom of the System  and  Infinite Jest, wherein the refusal to close the temporal loop is itself a
signifying practice. 
Instead, 1Q84 presents a thrust at utopic dislocation through its twin-mooned world, but in
terms of narrative builds and builds until the repetition causes a realisation that resolution is too
late. It is utopian in the “no place” homophonic prefix through the too late; the time that remains is
too  little.  This  encoded,  again crypto-didactic,  metafictive practice  is  a  refinement  of  its  crude
precursor  in  Barth's  1960s  metafiction  and  points  to  the  pedagogical  mode;  rather  than
metafictionally  stating its  utopian nature,  the text  shows this,  which may sound like a creative
writing class cliché, but is probably more akin to an inversion of Frank Ramsey's statement on
Wittgenstein: perhaps rather than outright saying it, the text structurally whistles it.
[SLIDE] This makes sense as an extrapolation from Marin's formulation of literary utopia.
Indeed, his table of contents splits fiction into simulacrum and signification, a schema of codes and
play  that  correspond  to  enunciation  and  the  enunciated  expression,  thus  implying  a  dialogic
structure. In short, between practice and discourse, fiction sits as the “stage,” the utopian operation
of process (Marin 1990, 27). 2666 is a text that deliberately signals itself in this mode. Its city is not
Ciudad Juárez but an emphatically insisted-upon intra-textual reality:  “Santa Teresa.  I'm talking
about Santa Teresa” (Bolaño 2009, 459). Bolaño even announces that we should read  2666  in a
critical dystopic mode through his mapping of the city space. In this aspect of the text, Bolaño
reworks Marin's formulation that the utopian city “gives not a possible route, or even a system of
possible routes, but articulations signaled by closed and open surface spaces” (Marin 1990, 208) in
the fact that his city is mapped by the female body, navigated by the male police officials, and
mediated through the intersubjective shifts  of narration in the novel.  To evoke Borges, as does
Marin, this is a one-to-one map of the necropolis narrated with the body-as-text.
This questioning of societal independence in art, in conjunction with the idea of the utopian
in 2666, prompts a return to Louis Marin and his reading of May '68. Bolaño clearly signals that the
function of the university, or rather its breakdown, is crucial to his investigation through the satirical
portrayal of the literature professors and the pretentious writing of his fictional author, who trails
sentences  thus:  “then,  too,  then,  too,  then,  too”  (Bolaño 2009,  661).  As  Farred  puts  it:  “2666
satirizes the cult status that the Archimboldians of all theoretical stripes have assigned the elusive,
Pynchonesque author” (Farred 2010, 699). Although it is worth noting the greater menippean nature
of this satire in opposition to, say, “An Orison of Sonmi~451” in David Mitchell's  Cloud Atlas,
which swipes specifically  at  the Golden Arches of  the capitalist  diner,  one of  the key didactic
purposes of Bolaño's novel is an attempt to critically evaluate the academy: the neoliberal university
as a site of revolution and resistance. Examining these sites in his theoretical work, Marin asks:
“[w]asn't  this  the  place  where  the  relationship  between  teacher  and  student,  authorized  and
institutionalized, could be deconstructed through this relationship's very content?” (Marin 1990, 4).
As has already been mentioned, but will be explored in much more detail now, the dystopia
of 2666 brings a specific focus to the structure of the university and it makes several critiques upon
this institution. Foremost among these appears to be the failure of '68 that the text historically cross-
links to a critique of theology. As shall be seen, this is a strange critique that fluctuates between
modes, but that seems to be bridged by liberation theology, particularly given the novel's South
America setting: the home of Gustavo Gutierrez and liberation theology. [SLIDE]
 To begin, it is worthwhile noting the critique that 2666 levels at theology and the associated
mechanisms of its  organized forms. At  its  content  level,  Bolaño's  text  enacts  a  straightforward
critique of a wholly theocentric, as opposed to anthropocentric, model. This is because, amid the
truly  criminal  femicide  taking  place  at  the  outskirts  of  Santa  Teresa,  in  the  dumps  of  the
dispossessed, the police choose to divert much of their labour to solving the isolated case of a
church-defiler, the so-called Demon Penitent, who urinates in churches, albeit also stabbing a priest.
Furthermore, this diversion serves to bring focus to a waste of resources in attacking those who
attack the church, when, for Bolaño, it seems that real social change will not come through any
theological component.
There  is,  however,  one caveat  to  this  rejection.  In  one of  the  novel's  many metatextual
moments, Bolaño writes: “[n]ot reading, it might be said, was the highest expression of atheism […]
If you don't believe in God, how do you believe in a fucking book?” (Bolaño 2009, 550). This
appears to suggest, in an always-theological model of fiction, that Bolaño does temper his anti-
clerical sentiments. However, perhaps the key here lies in the phrase “highest expression” and can
be profitably addressed, once more, with recourse to Adorno. Adorno and Horkheimer's Dialectic of
Enlightenment frames rationality in terms of a paradoxical dialectic where, at a certain point, the
aim  of  liberating  humans  from  fear  turns  against  itself  and  resolves  back  into  a  process  of
alienation.  This  seems  to  be  the  same implication  here.  If  rationality  is  allowed unchecked to
disregard everything that sits outside of its bounds, fiction too will be thrown to the wolves. That
said, the severe check on theology – even if its flipside, atheism, is also reprimanded – constitutes a
rejection of post-secular thinking, from a major figure in the first decade of twenty-first-century
literature  and  this  certainly  merits  consideration,  particularly  at  a  time  when  notions  of  re-
enchantment are appearing in the debate with ever-growing frequency.
The  specific  brand  of  theology  that  comes  under  fire  in  2666,  however, is  liberation
theology. While the murders are ongoing and the police are diverting much attention to tracking
down the Demon Penitent, rather than solving the murders, Sergio González (modelled on Sergio
González Rodríguez) speaks with a priest and only then learns “that crimes other than the Penitent's
were being committed in Santa Teresa” (Bolaño 2009, 378). When asked what he reads, the priest
responds  “[l]iberation  theology,  especially”  (Bolaño  2009,  379).  By  way  of  brief  introduction,
liberation theology is a strand of Christianity that interprets the teachings of Christ in terms of
freedom  from  injustice,  be  that  social,  economic  or  political.  It  is,  however,  in  Jay  Winter's
assessment in his Dreams of Peace and Freedom, a movement that is crucial to the 1960s and it is
here that the interconnected nodal network of the university, a critique of theology, the police and
the Holocaust can begin to come into focus.
Part of this link to the '60s comes from a trans-Atlantic, European context, which  2666
specifically  sets  to  re-introduce and relativize.  Here,  a  different  brand of  liberation theology is
crucial to '68, as Winter notes, because, through the radical self-sacrifice of Dietrich Bonhoeffer “in
the early part of the decade [the 1960s], the subject of the Nazi extermination of the Jews was
beginning to escape from the veil which had obscured it over the previous decade. This was now a
subject of direct moral and political relevance, and contributed much to the background of the 1968
revolt” (Winter 2006, 142). This link between South American liberation theology and its European
counterpart  is  mirrored  in  the  murders  in  2666.  Charting  a  worldwide  course,  Bolaño's  author
character Archimboldi is revealed, in the final part, to have killed a German bureaucrat who was
responsible  for ordering the deaths of his  Jewish prisoners.  Although this  is  revealed obliquely
through the phrase “[s]omeone had strangled him,” it is clear that the killer is indeed Hans Reiter
(Archimbaldi's real name), who has just heard Sammer's horrific tale (Bolaño 2009, 767). Thus, the
murders in Santa Teresa are linked, by Bolaño to the Holocaust, in the same way that Winter links
liberation theology, which Bolaño explicitly mentions, to this terrible chapter in European history
and in the same way that Pynchon's epic texts trans-historicize.
[SLIDE] The common point of locus, then, for Jay Winter's appraisal of liberation theology
and for Bolaño's utopianism combined with the explicit critique of the university, via the Holocaust,
is 1968. Indeed, in thinking through the didacticism of twenty-first-century utopianism, '68 is key.
While there were jokes – “je suis Marxiste, tendance Groucho” (Winter 2006, 152) – the core utopic
thrust is better shown in the '68 graffiti: “sous le pavé, la plage” – “under the paving stones, the
beach”. This utopian sentiment, which forms the epigraph to Pynchon's Inherent Vice, is a heritage
to which  2666  is  sensitive,  albeit  in a dialectical fashion. The beach beneath the contemporary
concrete  here  is  the  retribution  that  Archimbaldi  enacts,  albeit  a  justice  that  required  the  most
heinous crime of the twentieth century for its existence and that is subsequently paralleled in the
paranoid connections that the reader makes to the murders in Santa Teresa. While other fictions may
be more cynical – Pynchon presents a genealogy of racist property appropriation in the creation of
beaches in  Inherent Vice – Bolaño's focus on globalization, utopia and the revolutionary project of
the late '60s is clear, even if not clear-cut.
The entanglement of the university, however, in the dystopic critique of  2666 is furthered
through the clear statements that show, not a site of pure learning divorced from the horrendous
events that are charted throughout the novel, or even one on the correct side of the failed revolution
of  1968,  but  instead,  an  institution  connected  by  blood.  In  fact,  the  most  transparent  of  these
signposts  is  the  family bloodline:  Don Pedro Negrete,  head of  the  ineffectual  and corrupt  city
police, is the “twin brother of the university rector” (Bolaño 2009, 606). The scorn poured on the
university here is not a simple case of an anti-academic authorial jibe, but an insinuation that the
entire mechanism of the university is twinned with corruption that permits mass rape and slaughter.
Bolaño shows that the idea of the university as a site of detached, utopian purity is deeply flawed
through an almost idealist mode. The surface appearance of the critics is of eccentric and pedantic
individuals obsessed with their texts, merely isolated, but harmless. Their essence, however, is one
of violence.  [SLIDE] This is most clearly revealed when they savagely beat the taxi driver who
objects  to  their  polyamorous interest  in  Liz  Norton.  At  this  point  the  text  suddenly  veers  into
discourses of national and religious hatred. Bolaño's text is instantly peppered with “English” vs.
“Pakistani” and the violence is purported to embody the insults:
shove Islam up your ass […] this one is for Salman Rushdie […] this one is for the
feminists of Paris […] this one is for the feminists of New York [...] this one is for
the ghost of Valerie Solanas,  you son of a  bitch,  and on and on, until  he was
unconscious and bleeding from every orifice in the head, except the eyes (Bolaño
2009, 74)
The invocation of feminism as justification for violence is particularly pertinent not only to the
femicides in Mexico, but also, of course, in a wider discussion regarding occidental neo-colonialism
and Islamophobia. In this instance, it is the university that appears central to this violence.
As Bolaño gives no straight out-and-out reasoning for why the university can be seen as
totally complicit with this violence, it seems obvious to link it with Grant Farred's assertion of a
critique of neoliberalism and the academy's growing entanglement with big business. This is seen in
the function of exclusivity in the university structure. When the critics first meet Amalfitano “the
first  impression” they had “was mostly  negative,  in  keeping with  the mediocrity  of  the  place”
(Bolaño 2009, 114). The exception to the group here is Liz Norton, an educated and intelligent
character, but one who is less tightly bound to the academic institution: “[a]ll they knew about Liz
Norton was that she taught German literature at a university in London. And that, unlike them, she
wasn't a full professor” (Bolaño 2009, 12). Unlike the other critics, Norton sees the human being
rather  than the competitive academic:  her  “impression was of  sad man whose life  was ebbing
slowly away” (Bolaño 2009, 114). Indeed, though, “[w]hen Amalfitano told them he had translated
The Endless Rose,” one of the fictional author, Archimbaldi's, novels, “the critics' opinion of him
changed” (Bolaño 2009,  116).  The structures  of  value  and worth  that  the  academy co-opts,  in
keeping with all neoliberal, late-capitalist vocational careers, is one of excellence amid competition.
To distinguish oneself from the mediocre mass is the aim, but the “mediocre” mass, in  2666 are
being sequentially murdered.
[SLIDE]  The fundamental critique of the university's entanglement with neoliberalism is
now well known and rehearsed, particularly in humanities departments, but is well summarised by
Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades:
Public colleges and universities are exemplars of neoliberalism. As with neoliberal
regimes worldwide, U.S. public higher education assigns markets central social
value.  Public  colleges  and  universities  emphasize  that  they  support  corporate
competitiveness through their major role in the global, knowledge-based economy.
They stress their role in training advanced students for professional positions close
to the technoscience core of knowledge economies (Slaughter and Rhoades 2000,
73).
Clearly,  from such critiques,  the direct threat to the liberal  Enlightenment humanist educational
project through entanglement with the market is the main objection. This prompts two responses
that  are  pertinent  to  2666.  The  first  is  a  counter-objection  that,  as  Stephen Billet  puts  it,  “the
provision of vocational education through universities has long existed, and has always been largely
directed towards occupational purposes, despite the contrary often being claimed” (Billett 2011, 8).
The fact that these vocations are well-paid and in intellectually demanding areas is often overlooked
in the denunciation of the university's claimed secession to the needs of society. The second is that,
if  we are  to  see  the  university  and the  police  as  twinned,  as  Bolaño's  novel  implies,  then  the
function of the university that is under critique shifts slightly: the university must work, as with
late-Foucault's reading of the police, to create a “live, active, productive man” but also to totalise
and discipline (Foucault 1999, 149).
2666  presents, from this, an academy divided against itself. As revolutionary praxis, it is
failure: the legacy of '68 has only been a further entrenchment of the academy in neoliberal models
of commodified education. As utopian project, to follow Marin's schema, the university also falls
down: the supposition of the university's function as pure and discrete from commerce or the aims
of society leads to segregation and implicit complicity with the polishing off of the lower class. This
is clearly seen in the fact that the bumbling literature professors, alongside the rector who looked
“as if every day he took long meditative walks in the country” (Bolaño 2009, 111), form a group
whose exegesis of Archimbaldi's texts as a “Dionysian vision of ultimate carnival” sits in opposition
to another group's readings of “suffering” and “civic duty” in the writer's works (Bolaño 2009, 12).
It is the eponymous critics whose reading prevails in the text's narrative and, in their critique and
obsession with aesthetics, rather than the social, the suffering is erased.
 When viewed in this light, the role of the university in 2666 brings Bolaño's project back
full-circle to notions of commitment and didacticism. Interestingly, what seems to emerge from this
treatment is that the issues of commitment that  2666  frames do not appear to be concerned with
artistic practice. Instead, they are turned upon the academy. Bolaño's novel, in its treatment of the
critics  seems  designed  to  discipline,  train  and  encourage  critics  and  the  academy  to  write
sociologically engaged criticism. Indeed, this fiction of process, a brand of metafiction that calls
attention to affect and mechanism through its overloading, is designed to alter critical subjectivity;
perhaps, dare I say it, a reflexive transformed subjectivity through reading – a very late-Foucauldian
ethics. Consider the conversation between two of Bolaño's characters: [SLIDE]
'That's a pretty story. […] A pity I'm too old and have seen too much to believe it'
'It has nothing to do with belief […] it has to do with understanding, and then
changing' (716).
This does, of course, have ironic consequences because, under such a mode, Bolaño's novel takes
on utilitarian characteristics: it is itself as entangled in the neoliberal web as the objects of its own
critique and the investment of intellectual capital is economically analogous, in part, to the capitalist
mode of reproduction.
If this  poses a problem for the novel,  however,  2666  manages to avoid other dangerous
modes through the temporality within which its critique is framed. Most utopian fictions have to
dislocate their spatial and temporal setting. Here Bolaño certainly re-spatializes his setting, but its
temporality is debatably located amid a fluctuation of the contemporary and the future, especially so
when the novel's title is read through the reference in  Amulet  to“a cemetery in the year 2666”
(Bolaño  2008,  86).  The  interesting  point  here  is  that  Bolaño's  novel  specifically  avoids  the
conservative  nostalgia,  the  looking  back,  of  many  texts  through  its  future-orientation,  even  if
dystopic. Again, think of Pynchon's wistful forks in the road that America never took in Gravity's
Rainbow, Mason & Dixon, Against the Day, or even Inherent Vice's elegy for the fog of the sixties.
Bolaño's fiction of process teaches us that we do not need new theories to understand its crypto-
didactic message, but that we do need new theories to effectively resist domination and injustice in
the twenty-first-century, in a space where “the victims of sex crimes in this city” number “[m]ore
that two thousand a year. And almost half of them are underage. And probably at least that many
don't report being attacked. […] every day more than ten women are raped here” (Bolaño 2009,
563).
What I've tried to suggest today, thinking through the utopic practice of 2666 after a reading
of Pynchon's ethical strains,  is that it provides a valuable model for examining the aesthetics of a
new breed of autocritical didactic work, no matter how embedded that didacticism might be. In this
instance, the utopic future-orientation of this novel can be used profitably to reconsider the neo-
liberal co-option of the university and to attempt to posit  new forks in the road at  our present
juncture, rather than nostalgically lamenting already-faded moments and cynically decrying new
proposals for change. 
Finally, I'd like to suggest that through the retro-theoretical return enacted in this piece, an
Adorno for  texts,  provides  us  an  anti-Adorno for  praxis;  reading  texts  to  reveal  their  political
process to posit utopia once more may be a way out of the stasis of pure theoria. As Catherine
Belsey  puts  it:  “[a]ssumptions  about  literature  involve  assumptions  about  language  and  about
meaning, and these in turn involve assumptions about human society. The independent universe of
literature and autonomy of criticism are false” (Belsey 2002, 27). Although this doesn't get us out of
Adorno's theoretical problem that, in the false world all praxis is false, Roberto Bolaño espouses, in
2666, a newly naïve ethics that asks us to believe once more in the political, utopian and didactic
function of writing, both critical and creative. Critics must not, though, be didactic. Bolaño makes it
clear enough that this task is to be left to fiction, for otherwise the critics become “like missionaries
ready to instill faith in God […] less interested in literature than in literary criticism, the one field,
according to them – some of them, anyway – where revolution was still possible” (Bolaño 2009,
72). We may be in the too late phase now where, despite the interconnectedness of criticism and
praxis, revolution is no longer possible. To conclude, though, allow me to give the last word to
Roberto Bolaño with one final quotation from  2666 that sums up this retreat back to theory, to
fiction abstaining from the creation of a just life but didactically howling through its process for a
praxis nonetheless, for despite the criticism of the critics, Bolaño also makes it clear that he does
not want a vacuum: “[w]hat is it I want you to do? asked the congresswoman. I want you to write
about this, keep writing about this.  [SLIDE] […] I want you to strike hard, strike human flesh,
unassailable flesh, not shadows” (Bolaño 2009, 631).
